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Executive Summary 
 
Backed by peaceful but undemocratic presidential (2010) and legislative (July 2013) elections 
the Gnassingbé regime consolidated its power. In view of the absolute majority of the ruling 
party, its inclination for meaningful constitutional and electoral reforms, as demanded by the 
opposition and international donors, was further reduced. Overriding concerns for stability in 
West Africa in view of growing Islamist threats in neighbouring countries made that the 
delayed democratic reforms including the time and again reported local elections were 
condoned by the donor community. However, simmering discontent of the hardliners among 
the security forces and the barons of the ruling party was still visible. The opposition tried in 
vain to overcome its divide between its moderate and radical wing. An alliance of opposition 
parties and civic groups opposed the regime peacefully by frequent, often violently 
suppressed demonstrations with little effect. Arson attacks on the markets of Lomè and Kara 
in January 2013 served as pretense to harass opposition leaders. Human rights records of the 
government remained tarnished. The tense political climate persisted in view of the upcoming 
presidential elections in April 2015 and the apparent determination of the President to stay in 
power a third and eventually even a fourth term whatever the cost. Despite undeniable 
improvements of the framework and outside appearance of major institutions of the regime 
during the survey period it remained a façade democracy. However, the international 
community, notably African peers, the AU and ECOWAS, but also the Bretton-Woods 
Institutions, China and the EU, followed a ‘laissez faire’ approach in the interest of stability 
and their proper national interest in dealings with the country. Economic growth perspectives 
remained promising, expected to increase to 6.0% in 2014 and 6.3% in 2015, last but not least 
because of heavy assistance by the international donor community. However, growth is 
neither sustainable nor inclusive. It is  overshadowed by increasing inter-personal and 
regional inequality as well as an upturn in extreme poverty. 
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 Author’s extended and annotated version of ‘BTI 2016 – Togo Country Report’, amended with hyperlinks to 
several additional sources, references as well as a list of further readings. – The ‘BTI 2016 - Togo-Country 
Report’ is part of the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2016. It covers the period from 31 
January 2013 to 31 January 2015. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market 
economy as well as the quality of political management in 129 countries. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 
forthcoming (2016).  More on the BTI at http://www.bti-project.org . 
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History and Characteristics 
 
Togo, established in 1884 as German colony, became UN trusted territory under French 
administration after World War II and wrested its independence from France on 27 April 
1960. In the first democratic presidential elections of 1961 Sylvanus Olympio became 
president of the newly independent Togo. His  murder, on January 13, 1963, by a group of 
Togolese veterans of the French colonial army, led by sergeant Etienne Gnassingbé (later 
called Eyadéma) opened up a Pandora’s box. It was the first violent coup in the history of 
independent Sub-Saharan Africa. Although unanimously condemned by the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) in the beginning, African statesmen soon turned back to normal. After 
another coup d’état, ousting President Nicolas Grunitzki, Ltd. Col. (later General) Gnassingbé 
Eyadéma became president of Togo in 1967. Establishing a one-party government, Eyadéma 
ruled as Togo’s authoritarian head of state for 38 years. Taking advantage of the support of 
Western countries, who appreciated Togo’s capitalist orientation and its unwavering baking of 
Western positions in East-West cleavages General Eyadéma went almost unchallenged until 
1990. Over decades Togo was put on the drip of considerable development aid, which 
represented 51% of real GDI p.a. on average between 1965 and 1992. After the resumption of 
aid in 2008 aid dependency continued though on a smaller scale (ODA p.a. 7,2 - 17,0%  of 
GNI, 2010-2012; DAC 2014). Any efforts by the mostly clandestine opposition to expand 
freedom and democratic participation in the country were undermined. In July 1991, 
influenced by the implosion of the Soviet empire and by apparently successful 
democratization efforts in a number of African countries – including neighboring Benin – a 
Sovereign National Conference was organized with the objective of deciding on the country’s 
new constitutional and political order. The assembly opted for a semi-presidential system and 
elected an interim prime minister. Four months later, however, President Eyadéma ordered the 
army to attack the interim government, re-establishing his dictatorial power.  
 
The presidential elections that followed in 1993, 1998 and 2003 were not organized 
democratically, prompting major opposition groups to boycott them, which in turn resulted in 
overwhelming victories for Eyadéma. Attempts by opposition groups and civil society 
organizations to challenge the government through demonstrations and general strikes were 
brutally crushed in 1994 by the army and security forces. Political persecution of opponents in 
the following two years triggered a hitherto unknown wave of politically motivated migration 
of some 350.000 refugees to the neighbouring countries Benin, Ghana  or to Europe. Political 
resistance gradually lost out to apathy, pessimism and frustration.  
 
In 1993 the European Union and other major international and bilateral donors like Germany 
officially suspended its development cooperation with Togo because of gross human right 
abuses, despite the close ties Eyadéma maintained with the French President Jacques Chirac.  
Notwithstanding Togo’s political support from Paris, largely diminished international aid and 
the decline in investments had severe effects on the country’s economy. These effects were 
exacerbated by general apathy and the loss of human resources resulting from the out-
migration of highly qualified Togolese citizens. 
 
When Gnassingbé Eyadéma, died unexpectedly in February 2005 after nearly four decades of 
autocratic rule, Togo became a test case for indigenous democratisation efforts of African 
states. In defiance of the country’s constitution, the military proclaimed Faure Gnassingbé, a 
son of the late president, the new head of state. Widespread international protests compelled 
the new president to call presidential elections on 24 April 2005. Despite international 
protests against massive electoral irregularities, Faure Gnassingbé was sworn in as president 
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on 4 May 2005. The majority of the Togolese population protested against this manipulation 
of the public will, but the military brutally brought down the protests. About 700 people died, 
and more than 40,000 citizens migrated into neighboring countries. The economy of the 
country further declined. Finally, massive international pressure forced the antagonists of 
Togo’s political class into negotiations, which included the opposition political parties and 
civil society groups. This resulted in the so called Global Political Accord (APG) in August 
2006. The first free parliamentary elections took place on 4 October 2007. The governing 
party, (then the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais, RPT) won an overwhelming majority in 
with 50 seats against 31 for the opposition. The fact the RPT could achieve this broad margin 
with slightly more than a third of the general vote can be explained by the biased system of 
representation in which the less-populated north, the fief of the Gnassingbé clan, has more 
members of parliament than the more populated south. Presidential elections in March 2010 
paved the way for a second five-year mandate for Faure Gnassingbé. The elections, although 
marked by the lack of electoral reforms essential for free and fair polls as well as flagrant 
irregularities, were largely peaceful and therefore recognized as credible by the international 
community out of its overriding interest in the stability of the sub-region. The same applies 
for the legislative elections on 25 July 2013. 
 
 
 
Status Index 
 
Democracy Status 
 
Q1 | Stateness 
Q1.1 | Monopoly on the use of force 8 
 
Togo belongs to the impoverished fragile states according to OECD criteria. The state’s 
monopoly on the use of force is guaranteed in principle. However, there exists a long standing 
culture of impunity for extra-legal killings committed by the security forces. The army, 
gendarmerie and police are loyal to the incumbent government, apart from rivalries within its 
own ranks. This loyalty goes back to historically grown strong ethnic (Kabyè) and personal 
links between the army leadership and the presidential extended family. The power struggle 
within the Gnassingbé clan and between hardliners and modernisers among its followers in 
the security forces and the ruling party (RPT), was temporarily decided in favour of the 
president. In September 2011, the assumed ringleaders of a 2009 coup attempt were convicted 
by a Lomé court which re-enforced the command by the president. Faure`s younger half-
brother and former defence minister Kpatcha, as well as other family members, the retired 
army chief General Assani Tidjani, and Abi Atti a commander of gendarmerie, were served 
partly long jail sentences. However, the head of state was well aware of continuing discontent 
both within the security forces and the RPT, replaced in April 2012 by its ‘modernized’ 
successor UNIR (Union pour la Republique). Therefore, the ministry of defence remained 
attached to the presidency and a reform of the army (Forces armées togolaises, FAT) 
announced in December 2013. The commanding heights of the military were replaced with 
his followers one for one. Thus, by the end of 2013 the Chief of Defense Staff of the Togolese 
Armed Forces (FAT), Major General Atcha Titikpina, was replaced after three years in office 
by Colonel, now General Félix Abalo Kadanga, who had been promoted already one year ago 
as Chief of Staff of the Togolese Army (land forces of FAT). Colonel M’Ba Koffi Batanda, 
former head of the Presidential Guard (RCGP) was now entrusted with the latter post. 
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Kadanga is brother in law of Kpatcha Gnassingbé, the imprisoned former minister of defense. 
As head of the Rapid Intervention Force (FIR) Kadanga had played a crucial role in the arrest 
of Kpatcha who had been accused of an coup attempt against his half-brother Faure in 2009. 
The Navy was entrusted to Captain Adjo Vignon Kwassiv, whereas Captain Takougnadi 
Nayo was appointed Chief of Military Staff of the President. By the end of 2014, two 
battalions of a newly created Rapid Intervention Force (BIR) of 550 well-equipped troops 
each will be created according to the French model. Raymond Germanos, the dubious military 
advisor of Gnassingbé, a retired French five-star general and a freemason, dishonourable 
discharged with a criminal record for paedophilia, will supervise the installation of these 
battalions in Lomé and Kara. , the respective head-quarters of the newly created Southern and 
Northern military region, each subdivided in five sectors. Col. Awoki Panassa, former head of 
the National Gendarmerie, turned into chief of staff of the president in replacing Néyo 
Takougnadi, who became head of the national marine. A fundamental reform of the national 
gendarmerie with the creation of two regional directorates was announced at the same time. 
Yotroféi Massina, the chef of the controversial intelligence agency (ANR), accused of torture 
in 2012 by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), became head of the 
gendarmerie. Mid October the protection of the electoral process, which had been hitherto the 
task of the national police under the command of the minister in charge of security and civil 
protection Col. Yark Daméhame, was transferred to the ministry of defence, that is to the head 
of state himself, who still guards the control of this ministry, anxious to nip any coup attempt 
in the bud. In addition, a special force to secure the presidential elections (FOSEP 2015) 
composed of elements of the gendarmerie and the police of about 8,000 troops was created in 
December 2014, co-financed by UNDP as in previous elections.  
 
According to U.N. reports, Togo has become a major hub of drug trafficking and money-
laundering in Western Africa related among others to profits from re-exports of used cars 
from Western Europe to neighbouring markets (mostly smuggling to Nigeria). According to 
UNODC the proceeds of trafficking are increasingly used by Islamist terrorist groups. Lomé, 
that had been served already as a hub of cocaine trade in West Africa since several years, did 
now enter also the heroin trade from Asia via Eastern Africa. Piracy of the coast of West 
Africa – particularly in the Gulf of Guinea around Nigeria, Benin and Togo– had become a 
new international ‘hot spot’. They are now classified as high risk zones by maritime insurance 
companies. In June 2013 the Joint War Committee (JWC) added the waters of Togo’s 
exclusive economic zones north of latitude 3° to the West Africa high-risk area. Many of 
these pirates are said to be Nigerian gangs, cooperating with politicians, the military and 
custom officials, with intimate knowledge of the oil industry and oil tankers, probably derived 
from previous experience in the Nigerian Niger Delta. In 2013 Nigerian piracy attacks I the 
Gulf of Guinea grew to its highest level since 2008 with 31 of the 51 attacks reported in the 
region according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Both low- and high-level 
corruption facilitate and encourage this pirate-related activity. On 19 September 2013 the 
representative of the EU in Benin launched the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Route project 
(CRIMGO), a pilot-project of seven African countries, including Togo, in order to enhance 
maritime governance. In September 2014 the ECOWAS was set to follow suit in launching a 
maritime piloting zone to fight piracy including the coastal waters of Nigeria, Benin and 
Togo. In 2014 the deep water harbour of Lomé emerged as the primary African destination 
for US gasoline exports, partly as a way to thwart pirates. Thereby big tankers discharge to 
smaller vessels that move further on, mostly to Nigeria and Ghana, which is considered more 
secure than lightering off the coast. 
 
Q1.2 | State identity 8 
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Aside from the historical domination of Togo’s political administration by northerners, there 
were remarkable tendencies for a political instrumentalized xenophobia, notably concerning 
the politics of ‚Togolité’, as codified by the revision of the constitution of 2002. Thereby, 
exiled opponents (like former opposition leader Gylchrist Olympio), and refugees were 
treated as ‘foreigners’, who could not stand for elections. Another example is the 
differentiation between ‘authentic’, ‘original’, or ‘true’ Togolese, as propagated by 
government media during pre-election periods vis à vis the so called ‘Southern immigrants’, i. 
e. the Ewé ethnic group, which immigrated centuries ago from neighboring Ghana. Tensions 
between ethnic groups, particularly those between dominant Kabyè of the North in politics 
and in the security services and the economically more powerful southern Ewé, still play a 
greater role in limiting equal access to remunerative and strategically important public 
authorities, thereby abetting nepotism and compromising good governance.  
 
However a ‘banal’ everyday nationalism and a sense of belonging to the nation developed 
during the past decades among the population. This patriotism can be observed for example 
during international soccer events when Togolese celebrate their national pride in favour of 
their team, nicknamed Les Eperviers (The Sparrow Hawks), which entered the FIFA World 
Cup in 2006 and reached the quarter-finals of the Africa Cup of Nations for the first time in 
history in 2013. The captain of the team, internationally renowned football star Emmanuel 
Adebayor, was elected as first Togolese ever African Footballer of the Year in 2008. An 
example of self-interested nationalism are calls of the trading elite, like the influential ‘Nana-
Benz’ (politically influential cloth-trading women, who during the 1970s earned more 
revenue than the phosphate industry) for limitation of market access of ‘Foreigners’, notably 
concerning the growing ‘unfair’ competition of Chinese small scale traders and of Nigerians, 
sweepingly accused of drug dealing. 
 
Q1.3 | No interference of religious dogmas 9 
 
The formally established religious groups – Christians (about 48% of population, mostly 
Catholic) and Sunni Muslims (about 30%, mostly of the Sufi order of the Tidjaniya) – seek to 
play a neutral and constructive role in the political system and to make democracy more 
vibrant, as was observed during the National Conference of 1991, the 2007 and 2013 
legislative elections and the active participation in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(CVJR - Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation) since 2009. Numerous vibrant 
Pentecostal churches are less active in secular public life, but they do not constitute a danger 
to the political system either. African traditional religions, notably vodun in the Southern 
regions and occult belief systems all over Togo, still play an important role in everyday life. 
Their priests often act as estimated conflict mediators at the local level. Ni-Mantche, the 
grand master of the vodun goodness Maman Kole in Southern Togo was counted in October 
2014 by Jeune Afrique in an non-exhaustive ranking of the 15 most influent religious leaders 
in Africa as one of the most celebrated African vodun priests. However, the past 
instrumentalization of African religions and occult belief systems by the ruling powers for 
political means and political motivated witch-hunts as proofed by the defunct Eyadéma 
regime can be revived any time. It is still an underlying current of all religious beliefs 
regardless of its spiritual orientation. It was – and probably is -  not restricted to the person of 
late General Eyadéma, nor to the ideological underpinning and legitimization of the worldly 
power of the head of state, but  encompasses nearly all levels of public administration from 
the top, down to the level of simple district heads. 
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Q1.4 | Basic administration 6 
 
Whereas the state’s basic administration extends throughout the entire territory, it is 
functionally deficient. It continues to suffer from the parallel structures of formal and 
informal institutions (e.g. traditional chieftaincies) inherited from colonial rule. The role of 
traditional chiefs was adapted in decades of despotism to the needs of the ruling elite by the 
politics of ‘authenticity’, i.e. the reference to (re-invented) traditional rules, and by the forced 
‘alignment’ of chiefs in the National Confederation of traditional rulers of Togo (l'Union 
nationale des chefs traditionnels du Togo) created in August 1969. In addition, the legitimacy 
crisis left behind by decades of despotic rule and growing corruption in a fragile economic 
environment are barriers to good government and a transparent administration. The state’s 
administrative organizational structure is centralized. Devolution of the administrative system 
was one of the commitments made to the European Union (2004) before economic sanctions 
could be lifted. However, the power elite still lacks the political will for decentralisation of 
power and resources in order to enhance local autonomy, as demanded by the constitution, the 
opposition and the donor community. Local elections were postponed time and again since 
1987 when the last communal elections had been held. 
 
 
Q2 | Political Participation 
Q2.1 | Free and fair elections 4 
 
Compared to previous elections in Togo, the parliamentary elections of 4 October 2007 were 
the first reasonable free and fair elections in the country. However, the controversial 
delimitation of the Togolese constituencies still favors the governing RPT/UNIR 
tremendously in legislative elections. With only 39% of votes cast, the party was able to win 
50 out of 81 seats in the National Assembly (2007). In the legislative elections of 25 July 
2013, that had been due already in October 2012, but were postponed repeatedly because of 
disagreement over electoral reforms, the gerrymandering of constitutional borders resulted 
again in a disproportionate high victory of UNIR which won with 880,608 (46.7%) of votes 
68.1% of parliamentarian seats. The sensible decline of voter turnout from 85% in the 2007 
legislative elections to 65.79% (2013) indicated that the electorate had become frustrated by 
the state’s inaptness for meaningful reforms. According to a representative survey of 
Afrobarometer published in January 2015 about two third of the population held the opinion 
that the present electoral system does allow neither to vote the president out of office nor to 
vote for deputies who truly reflect the will of the electorate.  
Communal elections, although demanded by the constitution, have been postponed time and 
again since 1987 out of the lack of political will of the ruling elite to a devolution of power. In 
October 2014 the prime minister Ahoomey-Zunu ruled again out that they will take place 
before the upcoming presidential elections of 2015 as demanded. The presidential elections of 
4 March 2010, although overshadowed by an atmosphere of tension and suspicion, finally 
passed off largely peacefully, contrary to the previous rigged presidentials of 2005 with its 
aftermath of bloody political persecution. Although the incumbent won all 24 prefectures in 
four northern regions, and the opposition in the seven prefectures of the densely populated 
Maritime region, the election results revealed a gradual renunciation from established 
configurations of ethnic or regional voting and the resulting North-South divide in voting 
patterns. Both the president and the opposition leader gained historic scores in the former 
heartland of their adversary. Apparently, the Gnassingbé regime had learned its lessons from 
the past. It was eager to boost up its irregularly acquired power through legitimacy provided 
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by peaceful elections, which, although largely credible in the trend of the overall outcome, 
were neither free nor fair. The acting head of state won the elections with a comfortable 
margin. Thus the outgoing president was re-elected for a second five-year term. Undemocratic 
amendments of the 1992 constitution during the ‘constitutional coup’ of the RPT in 2002 
allow for a third term of the president in 2015 which is strongly contested by the opposition. 
The global political accord between government and opposition of 2006 (Accord Politique 
Global, APG) had provided for a return to the 1992 constitution’s limitation of two 
consecutive terms. The government agreed but wanted to apply this rule only from 2015 
onwards. This would result in Faure Gnassingbé standing in reality for a third and eventually 
a fourth time. Correcting the biased electoral system is one of the opposition’s most salient 
demands for electoral reform prior to the next elections. 
 
 
 
Q2.2 | Effective power to govern 2 
 
The president has the support of the country’s administration as well as that of the security 
forces. He does face little major structural constraints in putting his decisions into practice. 
However, the president is possibly not always in command of the hard-liners in the ruling 
party, the army and the secret service (Agence Nationale de Renseignement – ANR), accused 
of torture, other HR abuses and unlawful interference into government issues in a report of the 
Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH, February 2012). Prime minister 
Gilbert Houngbo resigned from office in July 2012 because of irreconcilable differences with 
the president about arbitrary acts of the ANR. He was replaced by former minister for 
commerce, Arthème K.S. Ahoomey-Zunu (23 July 2012). In general, the prime minister needs 
the president’s support more so than that of parliament if he wants to implement important 
pieces of policy. However, the president does not yet enjoy full democratic legitimacy, and it 
remains to be seen whether the powerful military will remain loyal to the president in spite of 
countervailing pressure by hard-liners within the army. 
 
Q2.3 | Association / assembly rights 6 
 
The guarantee and protection of freedom of assembly and association rights have improved 
since 2007. However, limitations, particularly on assembly rights persist. On 5 May 2011 a 
new bill on the right to freedom of association and assembly was adopted in parliament by the 
RPT/UFC majority. The law had been introduced as part of the coalition agreement in order 
to replace colonial regulations often used in the past to suppress opponents of the regime. The 
new bill liberalised demonstrations by permitting it without prior official permission, although 
they still can be banned because of disturbance of public order. However, it was contested by 
the opposition because draconic penalties apply for damages of public property to those who 
defy the ban. Therefore, the ‘radical’ opposition suspected that the law could still be used by 
the government to clamp down on the opposition under the guise of rule of law. In 2013 
strikes of teachers for a substantial pay rise and against subsequent school closures were 
supported by pupils in often violent demonstrations with political undercurrents. This 
escalated on 15 April 2013 in the shooting of a student and a 12 year old schoolboy in 
Dapaong, the northernmost prefectural capital when the police tried to stop a crowd from 
storming a government building. The unrest spread to several areas. On 22 May 2013, the 
government issued a two-day ban on public demonstrations after violent demonstrations of 
university students. Regular anti-government demonstrations of the Collectiv Sauvons le Togo 
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(CST), an alliance of parties of the so-called ‘radical’ opposition and civic groups, were 
harassed by security forces and pro-government militias. Other outstanding incidences were 
opposition protest against the arrest of opposition leaders imprisoned because of alleged 
involvement in the arson attacks on Lomé and Kara markets in early 2013. Marches and 
protests over labor issues, proposed media legislation, and political issues happened nearly 
weekly in the capital in 2013/14 though without further major incidences. 
 
Q2.4 | Freedom of expression 5 
 
There is a wide range of daily and weekly newspapers, a vibrant private press, a large number 
of (local) radio stations and three TV stations that send news regularly. In addition, a number 
of foreign stations can be followed freely. Twitter and other online social networks are more 
and more used both by the government and the opposition. Internet access is gradually 
improving, last but not least because of growing mobile phone penetration (which almost 
tripled between 2008 and 2013, but with 63% in 2013; was still the second lowest penetration 
rate of the WAEMU; internet users 4% in 2012). Freedom of speech and freedom of the press 
are guaranteed by law, but the law is not always respected. The High Authority of 
Broadcasting and Communications (HAAC), meant to protect press freedom and to ensure 
basic ethical standards, is heavily biased in favour of the government, notably during election 
campaigns. The parliament passed a more restrictive media law on 19 February 2013 that 
would have given the HAAC greater power over media with sweeping powers of censorship. 
Although the Constitutional Court overturned some of the repressive amendments of the 
media law, the lack of press freedom remained a critique of national and international HR 
bodies. In the global ranking of the Press Freedom Index (FPI) of the Paris based ‘Reporters 
sans Frontiers’ Togo fell by four places (rank 83 out of 179 countries) in 2013 but improved 
to rank 76 in 2014. 
 
 
 
Q3 | Rule of Law 
Q3.1 | Separation of powers 4 
 
The constitution of 1992 established the legal framework for a presidential multiparty system 
in Togo. The president is elected for five years. In a ‘constitutional coup’ at the end of 2002, 
the majority of the RPT in parliament (put in place by rigged elections) voted for a change of 
the constitution in order to guarantee the continuity of the political power of the Eyadéma clan 
in three crucial domains. First, it changed article 59 of the constitution, which now allowed 
for a third term of office of the president. Second, it revised article 62, which in its new 
version reduced the minimum age of presidential candidates from 45 to 35 years, to allow the 
candidature of Faure Gnassingbé, the young heir to the throne of his father. Third, it 
effectively excluded the major opposition candidate, Gilchrist Olympio, from the electoral 
process. The latter stipulation, which still prevented the opposition leader to participate in the 
2007 legislative elections, was eliminated by the new electoral law of August 2009. However, 
the latter newly introduced a first-past-the post system which provides  the incumbent with a 
comfortable advantage vis à vis his competitors. The new procedure is unusual and 
problematic under the prevailing African political conditions. Thereby the leading candidate 
wins in a single vote whether or not he gains an absolute majority, which eliminates the 
chances of opposition candidates to re-group for a run-off. The president offered the 
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opposition to compromise in the latter point, however his own party UNIR rejected the draft 
bill introduced by the government in parliament in June 2014. 
The prime minister is nominated by the majority group in the unicameral parliament and 
appointed by the president. However, great deal of power vested in the office of the president 
makes it difficult for the other sections of government to serve as a counterbalance. The 
legislature in particular needs much more technical and constitutional authority and capacity 
if it is to successfully act as a check on the president’s power. In addition, the corrupt 
judiciary has yet to live up to its constitutional role. 
 
Q3.2 | Independent judiciary 3 
 
An independent judiciary does not exist. The Supreme- and the Constitutional Court, the latter 
inaugurated only in 1997, are dominated by members loyal to the Ganssignbé clan and the 
ruling party, as various biased decisions on the outcome of elections and the exclusion of 9 
ANC MPs from parliament in November 2010 proved. In September 2014 the head of state 
and the UNIR majority in parliament, boycotted by the opposition, each re-elected largely the 
same notorious judges of the Constitutional Court as already chosen in 2007, including its 
president Abdou Assouma. Early October 2014, the latter published a controversial interview 
declaring the Global Political Accord (APG) as void with the advent of a functioning pluralist 
parliament as allegedly proven by the decision of the UNIR and UFC majority in parliament 
on 30 June 2014 to vote against the draft law on constitutional changes submitted by its own 
government. There is a decisive discrepancy between constitutional law and its 
implementation in reality. A separation of powers between judiciary and executive branches 
(attorney and police) does exist only rudimentary. The president of Togo’s Judges’ 
Professional Association (APMT) complained at the Association’s plenary at the end of 2008 
that the Togolese people have to suffer from a judicial system of two speeds, one for the poor 
and another one for those who are able to buy the judges’ conscience. A World Bank survey 
of doing businesses (2010) revealed that 60% of respondents believed that the courts were 
neither impartial nor free from corruption. This holds up to date. Moreover, it is still 
necessary to belong to the inner network dominated by the ruling party in order to be 
nominated to any influential position in the judiciary. It is even difficult for an independent 
lawyer to run a law firm because his chances to win the respective court cases are much lower 
than for regime friendly colleagues. 
Finally the judicial system suffers from legal pluralism, i.e. the separation of official and 
customary law derived from colonial times. The majority of the poor has hardly access to 
official law in actual practice. The traditional chiefs are considered as brokers between the 
state and the local population and declared to be the custodians of customary law (droit 
coutumier) by constitutional stipulations. However, many of them are discredited by decades 
of compliance with the autocratic Eyadéma regime. In addition, the conservative and 
patriarchal structures of the chefferie in general counteract the devolution of power to the 
local people as well as gender equality. 
 
Q3.3 | Prosecution of office abuse 3 
 
There exists a long-standing culture of impunity vis à vis human rights abuses of the security 
forces. Abuse of public office is still endemic in Togolese society, and the embezzlement of 
public funds remains rampant. However, the political opening has meant that corrupt 
officeholders are subjected to somewhat more (negative) publicity. Nonetheless, due to the 
judicial system’s shortcomings, these officials are rarely prosecuted. 
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Q3.4 | Civil rights 5 
 
Although the civil rights situation in Togo has improved substantially, serious problems 
persist. Deplorable prison conditions aroused international attention. According to a report (1 
September 2014) of the U.S. based Open Society-Justice Initiative Togo counted among the 
20 countries worldwide with the highest number of pre-trial detainees in relation to total 
prison population(65% in 2012). Detainees were penned up like sardines in prison cells of 6 
to 7 m up to 55 inmates. They had to rely on their families for basic food and drinking water. 
Prison staff delegated much of its authority to capos who effectively control and terrorise their 
co-inmates. Torture to extract confession remained widespread at police and gendarmerie 
posts. In early April 2014 the secretary of state minister of Justice, Christian Trimua and his 
delegation visited the site of the defunct concentration camp of Kazaboua-Agombio (Central 
Togo), for a controversial appraisal mission. Apparently he wanted to check whether it could 
be reopened as center of rehabilitation. During the Sovereign National Conference of 1991 
this torture camp under the Eyadéma regime had been singled out for especially cruel 
treatment of political prisoners. Plagued by corruption, the executive branch’s influence and 
lengthy pre-trial detention periods, the judicial system does not fulfill its function. Civil rights 
for a number of groups are restricted. Violence against women and  the practice of female 
genital mutilation (FGM) continue, though on a diminishing scale because of donor assisted 
awareness campaigns. FGM was formally outlawed already in 1998 and decreased probably 
by more than halve since 1996. But it still exists on a considerable scale (about 4 % on 
national average, UNICEF 2010), notably in the central and northern regions. There is 
regional and ethnic favoritism in public services and among the security forces, which are 
dominated by northerners (Kabyè). Other problems include child labor and the trafficking of 
people, especially children. 
On 23 June 2009 parliament voted unanimously for the abolition of the death penalty. Togo 
thus became the 15th member state of the AU and the 94th country worldwide to renounce the 
death penalty for all crimes. However, the bill was rather symbolic since in practice legal 
executions had ceased 30 year earlier. The thorny problem that remained was the extra-legal 
killings committed or condoned by the state in the course of political persecution in the past 
and continuing impunity, as shown by the final report of the CVJR published in April 2012. 
Togo has ratified most international HR-treaties. Nevertheless, there still remain important 
omissions. End of February 2014 the special rapporteur of the UN-Human Rights Council, 
Margaret Sekaggya, presented the findings of her mission to Togo encouraging the 
government to endorse UN treaties not yet ratified, including the UN convention against 
enforced disappearance and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Togo 
remains the only ECOWAS member not belonging to the ICC.  
 
 
 
Q4 | Stability of Democratic Institutions 
Q4.1 | Performance of democratic institutions 3 
 
Formal political institutions are only partially democratic and their performance remains 
deficient. The president’s conduct of office shows more transparency and commitment to 
dialogue than has been the case during his father’s regime. The question is whether his efforts 
are sincere and stable given that President Faure Gnassingbé is still surrounded by many 
figures of the old dictatorial regime. Whereas parliament now engages in controversial 
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debates, its deputies generally lack professional depth of knowledge. This is due, on the one 
hand, to the legislature’s insufficient working conditions and, on the other hand, to the fact 
that the opposition has yet to move beyond criticizing government and to formulate 
alternative policy proposals. Judicial reform is underway (a website of the Constitutional 
Court informs about current developments), but the aforementioned challenges (see 
“independent judiciary”) persisted throughout the assessment period. The ‘Freedom in the 
World Rating 2014’ of freedom house improved from the overall status of “not free” in 
previous years to “partly free”, mainly due to the peaceful conduct of the 2013 free, but not 
fair legislative elections. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index 2013 for Togo 
(EIU Togo 3rd quarter 2014) improved also by two places compared with the forgoing year to 
rank 128th out of 167 countries. However, the overall low score for 3.45 out of 10 remained 
unchanged. Togo was still classed as an ‘authoritarian regime’, ranking below Nigeria but 
above Cameroon and Guinea. 
 
Q4.2 | Commitment to democratic institutions 3 
 
The commitment to democratic institutions has obviously increased in the wake of the 
political opening and continuing pressure of international donors. Apparently, the Gnassingbé 
regime had learned its lessons from the past, as indicated by the formal rupture with the 
legacy of the former unity party RPT and its replacement by a modernized conservative party 
UNIR in April 2012. It was eager to boost up its irregularly acquired power through 
legitimacy provided by peaceful elections in 2007,  2010 and 2013. However, as far as the 
existing institutions are concerned, a high degree of skepticism remains, since the president 
was not elected democratically and parliament, still dominated by the RPT/UNIR, has not 
shown its real potential yet. The personal cult around the president is still present in daily life. 
All this, together with the unpredictable attitude of the hard-liners within the RPT/UNIR and 
the security forces, raises further doubts about the level of commitment to democratic 
institutions. 
 
 
 
Q5 | Political and Social Integration 
Q5.1 | Party system 4 
 
The multi-party system was introduced in 1991. Togo is actually heading towards a two-party 
system: The ruling UNIR, and the ANC (l’Alliance Nationale pour le Changement) which 
split from the UFC (l’Union des Forces de Changement) during the schism of the major 
opposition party as result of the lost presidential elections of 2010. The dissolution of the 
ruling RPT, the former socialist unity party, founded in 1969, in favour of a modernized party 
UNIR in April 2012 adapted the  outside appearance of the ruling party to the requirements of 
a modern multi-party system. This  included  a gradual democratic opening and regeneration 
of the party members, but the personalized informal party structures remained pretty much the 
same. UNIR gained the absolute majority in the 2013 legislative elections with 62 out of 91 
seats, the coalition partner UFC 3 seats. The reconciliation between RPT/UNIR and UFC 
resulted in a considerable weakening of the opposition. On 26.5.10 the veteran leader of the 
UFC, Gilchrist Olympio, whose chances ever to become president where going down the 
drain because of his advanced age, surprisingly agreed to join a ‘government of national 
recovery’. This constituted a landmark in Togolese politics, in view of the generation long 
rivalry between the Olympio and Gnasssingbé families. The constitutional court then decided 
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in a controversial decision on 22 November 2010 to deprive the ANC, the segregated part of 
the UFC, i.e. Fabre and eight other leading ANC members of their parliamentary mandate. 
The ECOWAS court of justice (Abuja) ruled in October 2011 the exclusion of the nine ANC 
legislators as unlawful. 
The opposition has been split between a ‘radical’ and a ‘moderate’ wing, labels which were 
originally attributed by the government in the 1990s, according to willingness of parties to 
cooperate. The ‘radical’ wing, is represented by a broad opposition alliance named Collectif 
Sauvons le Togo (CST, founded in April 2012), which is composed of political parties and 
civil-society organisations. It is led by the ANC and retained 19 parliamentarian seats in the 
legislative elections of July 2013. In August 2012 a confederation of smaller parties of the 
‘moderate’ opposition (e.g. Parti Démocratique Panafricain (PDP) led by Bassabi Kagbara, 
CPP (Convergence Patriotique Panafricaine) of the former RPT founding member and 
former prime-minister Edem Kodjo, the PDR (Parti pour la Démocratie et le Renouveau) of 
Zarifou Ayéva, and Nouvel Engagement Togolais (NET), led by Gerry Taama) joint in, by the 
foundation of a rainbow coalition ‘Arc-en-ciel’, originally meant to complement the CST. The 
coalition won 6 seats in the 2013 elections. NET was expelled again from the coalition in 
December 2014. Other renown ‘historical’ opposition parties of the 1990s, like the CAR 
(Comité d’action pour le renouveau) led by Dodzi Apévon and its former president Yaowi 
Agboyibo and the CDPA (Convention démocratique des peuples africains) of Léopold 
Gnininvi plunged into insignificance. According to the stipulations of a revised electoral bill 
of 2013, the leader of the biggest opposition party ANC, Jean-Pierre Fabre, is officially 
opposition leader. However, the other opposition parties are reluctant to recognize this 
position.  
The national uprising against president Compaoré in neighbouring Burkina Faso in early 
November 2014 encouraged the radical Togolese opposition and impacted also on the 
moderate forces to give in and agree after quarrelling for month to nominate Fabre (ANC) as 
unique opposition candidate for the upcoming presidential elections and to create a new 
common opposition alliance called Combat pour l’Alternative Politique en 2015 (CAP 2015). 
 
The party system still mirrors to a considerable extent regional and ethnic divisions. Thus, 
political parties tend to have readily identifiable ethnic and regional bases. The RPT/UNIR 
party was had greater representation among northern ethnic groups than among southern 
groups; the reverse was true of the UFC/ANC and CAR opposition parties. However, the 
presidentials of 2010 indicated a gradual departure from ethnic or regional voting. Although 
the incumbent won all 24 prefectures in four northern regions, and the opposition in the seven 
prefectures of the densely populated Maritime region, the election results revealed a gradual 
renunciation from established configurations of ethnic or regional voting and the resulting 
North-South divide in voting patterns. Both the president and the opposition leader gained 
historic scores in the former heartland of their adversary. 
 
Q5.2 | Interest groups 6 
 
Within the realm of informal politics there exists a broad range of interest groups, many of 
them biased in favour of the Gnassingbé regime. The most influential Christian churches and 
the Union of Muslims in Togo (UMT) however, exert a mediating and constructive political 
influence which has been recognized far beyond their own followers. Earth priests (chef de 
terre) and traditional chiefs still wield a strong influence at the local level. However, their role 
as guardians of tradition and customary law, as enshrined in the constitution, has not yet been 
determined by the national decentralisation program (Programme National de Consolidation 
de la Décentralisation, PNCD) initiated by the government in 2004. Student organisations 
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consider themselves as political avant-garde and act accordingly. Up to 2006, most of them 
were intimately linked to the ruling party. Thus, the High Council of Students’ Associations 
and Movements (HACAME) degenerated into a pro-government militia which actively 
supported the incumbent’s bloddy ‚enthronement’ in 2005. Since 2010, oppositional student 
organisations came to the fore which staged periodic anti-government demonstrations in the 
universities of Lomé and Kara since 2011. Their leaders suffered political persecution. 
Besides, there exist numerous professional representations of traders (notably the renown 
wealthy women cloth traders of Lomé, ‘Nana Benz’), farmers, lawyers, judges etc. However, 
they are either biased and close to the former unity party RPT/UNIR or of little political 
influence. Although there are a large number of labour unions in Togo, none of them have the 
strength or capacity to shape or heavily influence legislation. The unions also succeeded in 
convincing the government to continue paying subsidies for fuel and some staple food items 
as well as fertilizer so as to avoid a serious social crisis. 
With the democratic renewal of the early 1990s civil society organisations (CSO) 
mushroomed. According to informed estimates there existed about 2,000 CSO in 2012, of 
which 638 were registered NGOs. Since 1986 the government promotes its federation within 
FONTGO (Féderation des Organisations Non-Gouvernmentales au Togo, 144 members in 
2014). Many CSOs were created in the 1990s on the initiative of the Gnassingbé regime in 
order to influence non-partisan political expression in Togo and to circumvent the suspension 
of development cooperation with state institutions in view of flagrant human rights violations. 
Some of the most credible NGOs are not represented by this federation. Therefore, two 
concurrent umbrella organisations have been formed: in 1996 the UONGTO (Union des ONG 
du Togo, 124 members, 2014) and in May 2012 the FNRRT (Fédération Nationale des 
Réseaux Régionaux du Togo). Many, CSO are covered job and income generating measures 
of their founders (so-called ‘ONG-valises’). Their activities are mostly focussed on Lomé and 
the Southern regions. Their target-groups, especially the poor and underprivileged, including 
women, are rarely allowed adequate rights of participation or self-determination. However, 
there exist a handful of viable and independent national NGOs like ACAT-Togo (Action des 
Chrétiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture), which won the Human Rights price of the French 
Republic in 1997, the HR-organization LTDH (Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l’Homme), and 
the GF2D (Groupe de Réflexion et d´Action Femmes, Démocratie et Développement) 
concerned with gender equality. Some of them co-operate with political parties in broad anti-
government movements like the CST. Finally, there exist a semi-official organisation meant 
to enhance human rights, the CNDH (Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme, 
accredited in 1987, reformed in 2005). In February 2012 it submitted a critical report on 
torture within the ANR, as demanded by the government in view of growing international 
pressure. After CNDH president Koffi Kounté uncovered the falsification of the report when 
it was published by the government in February 2012 he was forced to flee to France in view 
of threats against his life. 
 
Q5.3 | Approval of democracy n/a 
 
There are no independent opinion polls conducted in Togo, but there is convincing anecdotal 
evidence that people indeed want a democratic system. This desire, however, does not so 
much express a reflected and informed approval of democratic principles and procedures than 
the profound desire for change. Nevertheless, the high level of participation (85%) at the 
legislative elections 2007 can be interpreted as an indication of the population’s clear 
commitment to take part in building their democracy. The relative low turn-out of 64.7% and 
66.1% during the presidentials of 2010 and the legislative elections of 2013 respectively was 
interpreted as sign of general disappointment of the opposition with the biased organisation of 
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the electoral process. This was confirmed by considerable regional variations in voter turn-
out, with 70% to 90% in the northern strongholds of the ruling RPT/UNIR and far lower 
figures in the southern opposition strongholds during the 2010 presidentials. 
 
Q5.4 | Social capital 7 
 
The history of informal political institutions in Togo shows the rich base of ‘traditional’ as 
well as ‘modern’ institutions that participate actively on all levels of the society. The most 
visible outcome of people’s participation was the Sovereign National Conference of 1991 
with representatives of all social strata of the nation. However, because the visions of this 
conference were dashed by violent political oppression of the dictatorial Eydéma regime up to 
2005, similar social initiatives were difficult to be re-established. On the base of the general 
political accord of 2006 the opposition the people in general were again more inclined to feel 
free to associate, to express their views and to organize themselves for self-help efforts, in 
spite of the government’s attempts to restrict association and assembly rights (see “association 
and assembly rights”). There exists a variety of traditional associations (including a multitude 
of microfinance or credit institutions, see banking sector),trade unions, human rights, religious 
and media organisations as well as numerous home town associations. Many of these self-
help groups are based on traditional systems of mutual support, others have been stimulated 
by international NGOs, churches or the government (see “interest groups”). It is unclear 
whether many of the new groups that have emerged rather spontaneously will be strong 
enough to stand the challenges of time. They suffer from lack of functionality, difficulties 
concerning its legal demarcation, volatility of supporting financial institutions or other 
organisational weaknesses. 
 
 
 
 
Market Economy Status 
 
 
Q6 | Level of Socioeconomic Development 
Q6.1 | Socioeconomic barriers 2 
 
The current socioeconomic situation in Togo is precarious. According to the HDI 2013 
overall life satisfaction is worldwide the lowest in Togo. Togo’s HDI-rank increased by one  
point to 159 (2012) of 187 countries compared with 2011. Although GNI per capita improved 
to $ 530 (2013), poverty remains on a high level at 59% (2011) of the population although it 
decreased slightly since 2006 (62%). However the depth and severity of poverty got worse 
and about 81% are vulnerable to fall in the poverty trap. According to the IMF (2014) the 
regional distribution varies from 91% below the poverty line in the Northern Savanes region 
to 33% in Lomé. The urban-rural divide is pronounced, 74.3% of the population in rural areas 
live below the poverty line (i.e., €239 annual income, notably in the Savanes, Central, Kara, 
and Maritime region) and 36.8% in Lomé (i.e., € 369 annual income). The distribution of 
regional and inter-household income inequality is increasing with a Gini coefficient of  34.4% 
(HDI 2013). Only 54% of the population has access to clean drinking water and 34% have 
access to sanitary equipment. There are only 8 doctors per 100,000 inhabitants. The live 
expectancy at birth is 57 5 years (2012), mortality for children under 5 years at 85 per 1,000 
live births (2013; WB). Adult literacy rate stands at 57.1% (2005-2010) about 30% received 
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secondary education (2010). The government adopted a new Poverty Reduction Strategy, the 
Strategy for Boosting Growth and Promoting Employment (SCAPE) 2013–2017) on 29 
August 2013. 
Discrimination of women is widespread but is decreasing slightly (see ‘Equal opportunities’). 
Available figures concerning the prevalence of HIV are only estimates. They vary between 
2.3% (estimate range: 1.4% - 4.1% in 2013) of adults aged 15 to 49 and 3,6% in 2001 and 
further decreased because of the introduction of free anti-retroviral treatment since November 
2008. According to the National AIDS Committee (CNLS) the HIV-rate fell from 5% to 2.3% 
between 2001 and 2014. New risks could develop in relation to the Ebola pandemic. Early 
October 2014 Togo was counted among the 10 African countries most likely to be exposed to 
an outbreak of Ebola by epidemiologic studies of North-Eastern Uni., Boston and Oxford 
University respectively. Shortly before, China had accorded funds (0.8 m US $) for Togo to 
buy Ebola screening equipment. During an extraordinary ECOWAS meeting in Accra which 
focused on Ebola (6 November 2014), Faure Gnassingbé was elected ECOWAS coordinator 
of Ebola related activities. 
Togo falls short of five of eight MDGs. Only in the health and educational sector the country 
stands a chance to achieve  its targets up to 2015. According to the 3rd UNDP report on 
Togo’s MDG achievements (April 2010) primary school enrolment (87%) had been one of the 
highest in the sub-region already before the introduction of universal free primary education 
in 2008 and thereupon is still increasing. However, endemic corruption and nepotism as well 
as expenses to upkeep the inflated army and security services impede implementation of 
structural adjustments, necessary to accomplish  the MDG. Up to 1991 Togo counted among 
the countries with the highest military expenditure per capita in SSA (in 2011 still 1.6% of 
GDP, SIPRI 2013). All in all, the changes in the country since 2006 have not yet led to a 
sensible improvement of people’s living conditions. The subsistence economy in rural areas, 
the potential of the informal sector in towns and remittances from exiled Togolese have 
helped to avoid a more severe crisis. However, on balance, Togolese citizens lack adequate 
freedom of choice and an effective decentralisation policy including a real devolution of 
power and means. 
 
 
 
Q7 | Organization of the Market and Competition 
Q7.1 | Market-based competition 4 
 
Generally, Togo lacks the foundations for sound market-based competition and good 
government. Insufficient access to credit constituted one of the major barriers to enterprise 
development, followed by meagre results of the fight against corruption on all levels of 
administration, including the judiciary. Fiscal deficits increased in recent years, raising 
sustainability concerns. The revival of the phosphate and cotton sectors by improved 
governance, the attraction of private investors and the capacity-building of cotton producer’s 
organisations, are still regarded by the World Bank and IMF as major drivers of growth. The 
Bretton Woods institutions cautioned the government in Lomé in 2014 that although growth 
has picked up during the past few years, government should care to make it more broad-based 
and sustainable, and its dividends widely shared. Regulatory burdens mean that the business 
climate in Togo is not very investment-friendly. Togo’s World Banks Doing Business 
indicator has improved little over the past six  years. In 2009 Togo was one of the most 
strenuous nation ranked 166, which however improved to 149 (2015) from 189 economies 
worldwide to do business in. As in the case of five other members of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which equally ranked at the bottom, its political 
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and administrative operating environment constituted a barrier to the growth of private direct 
investment and private sector activities. Major deficiencies in tax paying (high taxes and 
costly customs procedures), enforcing contracts, property registration and protecting investors 
impeded FDI. Private sector development is very slow. The allocation of foreign aid is crucial 
for investments into the country’s neglected infrastructure. Regulations on the labor market 
make flexibility in staff management difficult, especially when starting a new business. The 
non-salary cost of employing workers is high, and it is almost impossible to dissolve contracts 
without legal consequences. In addition, there is little flexibility in working hours as provided 
by the law. 
 
Q7.2 | Anti-monopoly policy 4 
 
Key sectors of the economy, notably the banking, cotton and phosphate sector, are still in the 
hand of either a few individuals or they are parastatals or state enterprises. A further 
privatization and adequate steps to attract foreign and domestic private investment are part of 
a strategy to stabilize macroeconomic stability and growth, but they have still to be put into 
practice. Privatisation of the state-owned banks was further delayed (cf. Banking system). 
Reforms of the mining, telecommunications and energy sectors progressed slowly under 
resistance from vested interests (IMF 2014). The Société nouvelle des phosphates de Togo 
(SNPT, joint-venture: 60% state, 40% farmers) short-listed four private partners for the 
planned expansion and modernization of ailing phosphate production which accounts together 
with sand (for cement) for around a quarter of export earnings. 
 
Q7.3 | Liberalization of foreign trade 6 
 
A World Bank survey of the Togolese economy and trade integration, commissioned by the 
Lomé government and published in September 2010, revealed a dramatic shift of exports 
caused by the ailing phosphate and cotton sectors. The former major export products were 
replaced by cement and clinker (35% and 40% of exports), and exports were increasingly 
directed to ECOWAS countries (68% of total). Togo is one of the West African ‘transit-
economies’, like neighbouring Benin. The so-called entrepôt trade (legal transit and mostly 
illegal re-export/smuggling combined) amounted to 75% of GDP in 2008 (total imports 109% 
of GDP; Golup 2012). It consisted mostly of petroleum products (from Nigeria), cotton from 
Burkina Faso and used cars (from Europe). The unofficial entrepot trade contributed to a 
culture of corruption and tax evasion. This could be reduced significantly if the ECOWAS 
would agree on the harmonization of import taxes and Nigeria would terminate its import 
bans on the products concerned. Togo’s entrepot trade is based on Lomé’s deep-water port 
that provided attractive storage capacities for neighboring countries.  
However, the Togolese population has yet to reap the benefits expected from the development 
of the free port of Lomé because the harbor remains in the hands of a few businessmen close 
to the political elite, who share the profits. Because it is the only deep water port in the sub-
region it increasingly attracts attention of global players. Thus, a Chinese company (CMHI) 
acquired a 50% stake in a Chinese-Dutch joint-venture for  the development of a new 
container terminal at the port of Lomé in 2012 in order to use it as transshipment harbour for 
the sub-region. High levels of corruption, slack enforcement and a laissez faire attitude of 
customs officials and politicians drive traders more and more into the informal sector of the 
shadow economy. The rising crime in the sub-region is mostly due to poor governance. Thus, 
moral hazard and competition with the rival port of Cotonou (Benin) concerning (mostly 
illicit) re-exports to Nigeria aggravated the negative effects on security. Lomé became even 
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more attractive to all sorts of international trafficking in drugs, small arms, used cars and most 
recently ( 4 tons in January 2014) ivory, the latter re-exported in huge quantities clandestinely 
via Lomé to Vietnam and China from all over central Africa. Ivory poaching thus contributed 
to a decrease of forest elephants in that region by more than 60% in the past decade. 
In addition, the Togo Free Zone-SAZOF created in 1989, aims to promote foreign trade and 
attract investments by facilitating competitive conditions for export-oriented businesses in 
Togo. In 2008 it comprised about 60 enterprises (valued at US$ 300) which provided with 
over 9,000 full-time jobs a significant proportion of employment in the formal private sector 
and exported US$ 260m. The World Bank recommended a restructuration of the free zone in 
order to promote more labour-intensive export industries. However, Togo’s economy remains 
vulnerable to shocks in export demand due to growth slowdown among its trading partners. 
As long as Togo’s economy continues to be highly subject to political influence, a more 
dynamic development can hardly be expected. 
In general, Togo’s weighted average tariff rate stood high at 14.2% (2012). Freedom of trade 
was further restricted by non-tariff barriers of trade. Although Togo’s chain-linked economic 
freedom rating increased during the past thirty years from 4.70 (1980) to 5.57 (2011, of max 
10 points), its economy still figured among the lowest ranks (141th of 152) in the 2013 
Economic Freedom of the World index by the Fraser Institute, reflecting notable deficits in 
trade-, monetary-, and investment freedom. Foreign direct investment was allowed only in 
certain sectors, its administration lacked transparency and was liable to corruption and 
political interference. The same trend concerning trade and business freedom as well as 
freedom from corruption is reflected in the Heritage Foundation ranking (2014) were Togo’s 
economy is still ranked as ‘repressed’ with rank 152 at the bottom of 165 countries. 
 
Q7.4 | Banking system 5 
 
The banking system in Togo has deteriorated since the early 1990s because of unprofessional 
government involvement in lending and banking decisions. As a consequence, the IMF 
requested in June 2007 a reform of the banking sector, which included measures to privatize 
government-run banks and avoid under-capitalization. The system was then put under the 
close survey of the WAEMU. More than 30 percent of loans issued to these banks were 
considered to be non-performing and strained by bad loans from parastatals. The government 
wanted to privatize public banks by the end of 2010. However, privatisation had been delayed 
due to the bank’s weak finances and the unwillingness of government to sell according to 
market conditions. Up to 2014 only two out of four banks have been privatized, and according 
to the IMF actions are needed to tackle vulnerabilities in other banks. . 
In addition to formal institutional banking, the microfinance system and informal traditional 
African saving and loans schemes (tontines, known as Adakavi in Togo) play an important 
role, especially for small and medium scale industries, notably in the informal sector. Apart 
from widespread informal mutual tontines with an estimated 1.333.934 beneficiaries, 
including 665.926 men, 577.169 women and 90.839 groups (Cellule d’appui et de suivi des 
institutions mutualiste ou coopératives d’épargne et de credit, Cas-imec, 2014), there existed 
in 2011 174 formal microfinance initiatives had been certified, with 736,484 depositors, 
almost 110,000 borrowers and a total of 145m US$ loans, used among others to finance small 
decentralized solar power projects. Of these institutions 102 were affiliated to the 8 major 
cooperative networks. 
 
 
 
Q8 | Currency and Price Stability 
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Q8.1 | Anti-inflation / forex policy 8 
 
As a member of the CFA franc zone, the country cannot pursue an independent monetary 
policy. The CFA franc is pegged to the Euro (F-CFA 655.957 : 1 €), and the central bank of 
WAEMU, the Banque centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), is meant to 
control inflation and the viability of the CFA franc’s peg to the Euro. Integration into the 
franc zone is still mainly justified out of political, not economic reasons, i.e. because of high 
exposure of West African countries to political crisis. Had franc zone countries not been 
linked to a strong currency at times of recurrent political crisis (as in Togo 2005, Cote 
d’Ivoire in 2011 or Mali in 2012), instability would have been aggravated by sharp 
depreciation of the currency, high inflation and increased dollarization according to the rating 
of the international rating agency Fitsch (2014). However, crucial common denominators of 
the CFA-Zone are not necessarily in the economic interest of Africa. Its shared colonial 
heritage, including a social and economic infrastructure, orientated at the mise en valeur of 
African resources for the former colonial power, entails considerable loss of economic and 
political sovereignty on the part of African member states. In addition, the volatility of the 
Euro, triggered by the global financial crisis and bad governance in some EU member states, 
shows that the perpetuation of the established monetary structure of the CFA-Zone becomes 
increasingly anachronistic. According to recent scholarly findings, membership of sub-
Saharan African countries in the CFA zone amplified effects of global business cycles. 
Member countries were more likely to experience a contraction in credit during the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 (Price & Elu 2014). The peg to the EMU, orientated at the interests of 
highly industrialized European countries, led to an overvaluation of the real exchange rate of 
the CFA, and could constitute an obstacle to sustainable indigenous development in 
francophone Africa. Yet, the major structural deficiencies within and between member states 
of each zone cannot be solved by monetary coordination alone. They require sustainable 
political and economic solutions, adapted to the specific needs of each of WAEMU members, 
aimed at the ownership of the measures and instruments by each country concerned. 
Therefore, African governments, including the government in Lomé, should get the priorities 
right, i.e. they ought to implement first sustainable solutions to the problems of crisis 
resolution and prevention, the fight against corruption and rent-seeking elites, in order to 
promote good governance, transparency and accountability. Consumer price inflation 
remained low (1.8% 2013, 2.4% in 2014 forecast because of rising administered fuel prices) 
due to the currency peg, moderate harvests and government subsidies on fuel prices. 
 
Q8.2 | Macrostability 7 
 
The government perused a stability oriented monetary and fiscal policy, backed by an IMF 
Extended Credit Facility-Programm (ECF, 2008-11: 151 Mio. US$), that achieved several key 
targets. In Oct. 2013 EU financial support had been agreed to rise to US$ 292m for the 
funding period 2014-20 within the framework of the 11th European Development Fund, 70% 
more than in the foregoing period 2008-13. In addition, the World Bank and other donors 
continued to support the economic revival. Remarkably, the World Bank led in January 2013 
via its private-sector funding agency International Finance Corporation (IFC) a consortium of 
financiers in Togo’s largest-ever private investment project, valued around US $ 300, meant 
to facilitate the construction of a private container terminal (LCT) at Lomé’s deep water port. 
It will have a capacity of 2.2m containers and will serve as a transhipment hub for the West 
African coast. The terminal still under construction is a Chinese-Dutch joint-venture totaling 
US $ 420 m. In October 2014 a third container terminal, financed with € 457m by the French 
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Bolloré group had already been completed. It allowed for the treatment of 1.2 m containers 
p.a. of the largest container vessels thereby tripling the handling capacity. This would impact 
positively also on the sub-regional trade with Togo’s land-locked neighbors. 
At the end of 2010, Togo had become the 31st country worldwide that successfully graduated 
from the HIPC process. The IMF and major bilateral donors like France, Germany and Italy 
approved the cancellation of debts. Because of the write-off, the debt burden fell from 52.7% 
of GDP (2009) to 17.2% (2010), or 32.3% including debts of parastatals. However, this 
affected structural reforms negatively which slowed down substantially since then. Notably 
reforms of the banking, phosphate and cotton sector lacked behind. The last ECF  had expired 
in 2011 and was meant to be extended by a successor ECF latest in December 2013. 
However, the IMF executive board did not approve the staff-level agreement of September 
2013 which meant that a new ECF would be agreed upon earliest in 2015. In February 2014 
the government finally implemented the new unified more efficient revenue authority (Office 
Togolais des Recettes, OTR), thus merging customs and taxing directorates, a measure which 
had been delayed since December 2012 when it had been decided in parliament. Nevertheless, 
considerable real economic growth (5.1% in 2013), with upward trend  was realized because 
of macroeconomic stability, new investments in infrastructure, the clinker and cement 
industry as well as mining exploration, as well as continuing donor support since 2008 (more 
than 4% of GDP) and absence of external shocks or market volatility to which the country is 
strongly exposed, notably in agriculture accounting for about one third of GDP. The fiscal 
deficit widened from 4% of GDP in 2012 to 6.8% (2013) but will probably narrow to 5.5% in 
2014, due to improved revenue collection. Because of possible election related expenses it 
could widen again in 2015. The current account deficit will remain high (13.4% of GDP  in 
2014 to 2015) because of growing public investment which in turn resulted in higher imports 
with exports of major foreign exchange earners (cotton, phosphate etc.) and transfer inflows 
lacking behind. 
 
 
 
Q9 | Private Property 
Q9.1 | Property rights 5 
 
The judicial system does not sufficiently protect private property. The influence exercised by 
the executive is too strong. Inheritance and property protection laws are deficient, notably for 
women. And where they exist, they are not adequately enforced. As for most of the laws, 
contracts are difficult to enforce. The ongoing reform of the judiciary needs to address these 
issues. Because of the state of quasi-lawlessness in many sectors, there is a substantial black 
market for illegally imported products, mainly electronics, computer software and cosmetics.  
The problem of a complex land tenure system in which traditional and modem law coexist 
and compete is exacerbated by land scarcity. The land tenure regulations are still dominated 
by traditional African customary laws, re-interpreted by traditional chieftaincies and local 
authorities, often to their own advantage, notably in the country side. Most contracts on 
agricultural land are still verbal. Disputes over land are extremely common. Only about 36% 
of arable land is under a tenure system that provided long-term security. Especially poor 
farmers, migrants and women have no secure rights. The fight against grabbing that 
threatened 25,000 ha in Togo, including 23 cases of lease contracts or large-scale land 
acquisitions gained in momentum (Forum national sur l’accaparement des terres, 
FOPADESC 2012). Among the rural areas mostly affected are those with high agricultural 
potential, such as the prefectures of Amou, Ogou, East-Mono, Haho, Kpélé and Kloto in the 
plateau region, as well as those on the plain of Mô in the central region. The perpetrators are 
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often affluent officials, politicians or businessmen. They use methods ranging from creating 
and sustaining inter-community conflicts to outright intimidation. Many of these lands are not 
cultivated over decades and just have a speculative value. These damaging practices endanger 
food security of the rural poor since the latter are deprived of their main production tool. 
Stakeholders urged the government to reinforce and implement its legal framework on the 
right of food within its national Food Security Program (PNIASA) and to  implement as soon 
as possible land reforms corresponding to international standards that prevent land grabbing 
and forced evictions (ANoRF-Togo 2013). 
 
 
Q9.2 | Private enterprise 5 
 
A limited sector of small-scale enterprises covers a greater part of the Togolese’ day–to-day 
consumption needs. But the private sector is comprised primarily of the agricultural sector, 
which employs 65% of the country’s labor force in both subsistence and small-scale 
commercial farming. The informal sector still prevails, it provides employment for more than 
three times as much labourers than the formal sector. On a larger scale, there are still too 
many hurdles to developing a stable private sector. Government procurement contracts and 
dispute settlements are subject to corrupt practices. In 2012 government adopted a new 
investment code promising equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors. However, 
investment is permitted only in certain sectors. Every investment must have a minimum value, 
and is screened on a case-by-case basis, which opens doors to further bribery. The lack of 
transparency and predictability, and the high informal transaction costs inhibit robust FDI. 
Foreign exchange accounts need prior government approval.  
In November 2010 the government ratified a Charter of Small and Medium Enterprises meant 
to promote the informal sector by providing a more friendly administrative environment for 
the development of SMEs. In 2014 it intended to establish an Autonomous National 
Investment Fund (Fonds d’Investissement National Autonome, FINA) for financing 
SMEs/SMIs which has not been realized so far. The part of SMEs in public orders remains 
negligible, i.e. below 5% on average in the WAEMU, because this sector was considered as 
the preserve of big enterprises and multinationals.  
The overall tax burden equals 16.7% of domestic income. About one quarter of government 
revenue is provided by tariffs. Regarding taxes to be paid by private enterprises, the 
government cut the rate of corporation tax to 30% (from 37%) for industrial firms  and to 33% 
(from 40%) for other enterprises. The highest income tax rate is 45 according the Heritage 
Foundation’s Economic Freedom account. 
 
 
 
Q10 | Welfare Regime 
Q10.1 | Social safety nets 3 
 
Togo’s welfare system is underdeveloped. It is available only to government employees and 
those employed in the formal sector. Monthly minimum wage (salaire minimum 
interprofessionnel garanti, SMIG) was increased in August 2008 to CFA 28,000 (€ 42.68,). 
The updated SMIG of CFA 35.000 (53 €) was applied to the Lomé free-trade-zone in January 
2012 by stipulations of the Convention Collective Interprofessionnelle du Togo. Working 
conditions in the export processing free zone of Lomé (SAZOF) are precarious and 
characterized by bad hygienic and security conditions. Nevertheless, it generated more than 
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11.560 jobs, one third of them occupied by women and about 40% by temporarily employed 
according to a study commissioned by the trade-union association (centrales syndicales 
togolaises, 2012). The Togolese minimum wage  still rather low compared with 60.000 (91 €) 
in Côte d’Ivoire  (2013)n and 18.000 Naira (85 €) in Nigeria, and in any case hardly enough 
to feed an individual for a month, besides it applies to the formal sector only. About 85% of 
population of working age is active an estimated 33% of them under-employed (2011), youth 
unemployment being a major problem in urban centers. The government tried to counteract 
this tendency with limited success by introducing in 2011 a program for unemployed school 
leavers (PROVONAT - Programme de Promotion du Volontariat au Togo), backed by UNDP 
and transferred since June 2014 into the National Agency of Volunteers in Togo (Agence 
Nationale de Volontariat au Togo, ANVT) of which 65% do not find employment after 
completing their studies. Up to 4,280 volunteers participated since 2011 of which 44% found 
employment.  
Pension schemes in Togo are not adequate enough to guarantee their beneficiaries a decent 
living. Despite the fact that the median age in Togo is 18.6 years (i.e., almost half of the 
population is younger than 18), the current system can no longer be financed. This is why the 
government has been negotiating with unions to increase the pension entry age for civil 
servants to 60, which would put further pressure on the labor market. The state of Togo’s 
health services system is lamentable. In February 2011 parliament adopted a new health 
insurance law covering the 80,000 agents of the public service who have to contribute 3.5% of 
their monthly wages. Most individuals suffering hardship or accidents rely either on the help 
of family (or clan) members or that of a traditional mutual assistance schemes. These schemes 
are self-organized by their members, who provide services either on a rotating basis (e.g., 
rotating savings clubs (tontines)) or in the event of an emergency. 
 
Q10.2 | Equal opportunity 4 
 
Togo does not provide equal opportunities to all citizens. While the political factors that 
disadvantaged the southern part of the country until 2006 no longer play an important role 
(apart from the public and security services), having a sufficiently wealthy family or relations 
in the administration remain important when securing formal employment. Apart from these 
inequalities on the basis of family or clan background, there are severe disadvantages for girls 
in the Togolese education system, notably with regard to secondary and higher education.  
According to an UNDP report of April 2010 the unequal distribution of the standard of living 
(Gini coefficient 33.5%) is overwhelmingly due to inequality in income differences according 
to region (North-South gap), gender and socio-economic strata. Although women are 
dominant in the informal sector (e.g. agriculture and petty trade), they have only very limited 
access to, and control of the factors of production (land, equipment, inputs, credit). In 
addition, it is highly unlikely that they will get equal access to wage employment in the 
formal sector up to 2015.  
The exclusion of women from key activities in the economy and politics has not improved 
remarkably. In 2008, the government introduced a national action plan to correct gender 
inequality (PNEEG - Plan d’Action national pour l’équité et l’égalité de genre au Togo 2009-
2013). However, the means to implement this policy are insufficient. Discrimination of 
women remains widespread. According to the Women’s Economic Opportunity Index (EIU 
2012) Togo counts among the lowest ranks (122 of 128 countries; Gender Inequality Index 
(GII), rank 129 of 187 in 2013).  
Gender inequality is most pronounced concerning property rights (land tenure), access to 
credit and employment. As for education the situation improved since 1990 (19% gender 
inequality in 2010). Girls are disadvantaged vis à vis boys the more the education level rises. 
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Women are underrepresented in the political arena, in government and parliament, in political 
parties and enterprises. The last legislative elections (2013) resulted in the election of 16 (of 
91) women deputies (17.6%), compared with 9 (11%) in the previous parliament elected in 
2007. Women comprised 11.1% of mayors and 0.38% of canton chiefs since the 2000s (IMF 
2014). An amendment of the Electoral Code after the 2013 elections requires that women 
have equal representation on the list of candidates submitted by the electoral parties. All the 
same, the representation of women in the cabinet decreased slightly from 28% in 2012 to 6 
women (26%) in the 27 head cabinet since the latest government reshuffle in September 2013. 
However, the socio-cultural conditions for a stronger participation of Togolese women in 
politics are rather bleak. A survey of Afrobarometer (2014) revealed significant gender 
differences concerning the interest in political affairs. Thus, just 31% of women participated 
in election campaigns against 52% men, and three times more men (27%) assisted candidates 
as women (8%) during the presidentials of 2010. 
 
 
 
Q11 | Economic Performance 
Q11.1 | Output strength 6 
 
The output record of the Togolese economy remains weak. Apart from domestic problems 
such as a poor infrastructure, erratic electricity supply, slow foreign investment, the suspense 
of international aid, and an adverse sociopolitical environment, the increase of imported food 
and fuel prices in the 1991-2008 period of political instability and subsequent aid crisis also 
had a severe impact upon the economy. Efficiency is higher in firms operating inside than 
outside the export processing zone. Factors like the foreign trade ratio, foreign capital 
investment and wage incentives have a strong impact on efficiency.  
Togo once counted among the largest phosphate producers in Africa. Phosphate provided 
40% of the country’s revenues from exports and made up more than 20% of Togo’s GDP. 
Since 1997, however, production has fallen from an annual 5.4 million metric tons to 800,000 
in 2010 – primarily due to corruption and mismanagement. Production increased again to 
900,000 tons in 2013, placing Togo now on the 19th rank of global phosphate producers 
before Canada and Syria. However, phosphate earnings, representing 14% of domestic 
exports (excluding re-exports) were limited by a 37.9% decline in world market prices. 
Privatization and ongoing new investment will contribute to a recovery of phosphate exports.  
Diversification of mining resources and more equal regional distribution of benefits was one 
of the major objectives promised by the president during UNIR’s foundation congress in April 
2012. In 2012 the Australian iron-ore and manganese development company Ferrex 
announced details on its current 92,390 ha exploration permits of the Nayega manganese 
project in northern Togo, which will be developed in cooperation with South African 
suppliers. The project expects low capital and operating cost of less than US $ 15 m for up to 
250,000 t/per year because of shallow open pit techniques applied. The product will be 
transported by road to the port of Lomé using the empty backload capacity of lorries in the 
transnational traffic from Burkina and Mali to Lomé. Ferrex expected to be granted the 
mining license and receive the environmental permit for Nayega from the government latest 
by the end of 2014. The company also completed a scoping study in 2014 on a proposed 
sintering and blast furnace facility to produce about 60 000 t/y of a 74% high-carbon 
ferromanganese alloy product, in Southern Togo, close to the port for the import of coke in 
the medium term. This would correspond to the government’s request to have value-added 
projects in the minerals industry seriously investigated.  
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In Bangéli, Central Togo, another company, the Indian ‘MM mining’, started to exploit iron 
ore. In December 2012 mine workers complaint of harsh working conditions, low payment, 
health hazards to the population and harassment of syndical activities by local authorities 
collaborating with the company. In general, there is a growing awareness among the 
population about the economic and health hazards of mining, as already shown by local anti-
mining activities in the phosphate mining areas southern Togo and concerning an aborted 
Indian bauxite mining project at the Mt. Agou, Kpalimé region, as well as reportedly illegal 
artisanal coltan mining activities of Chinese traders using child labor in the Ghanaian border 
region of Nyitoe, Kpalimé region. 
Besides, Togo joint the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2010.It reached 
compliance with the EITI in June 2013, but lack of  transparency concerning pending 
phosphate mining tenders remained a problem in 2014. Cotton production, the most important 
cash crop and major income earner for about 275.000 peasants, managed by the NCST 
(Nouvelle société cotonnière du Togo), fell by 18% to 67,000 t in 2013/14 compared with the 
forgoing cropping season. Production targets of 200.000 t by 2022 seem to be ambitious in 
view of  highly volatile world markets. Togo remains a ‘transit-economy’ dependent on its big 
neighbours Nigeria and Ghana. Re-exports, which constitute about 25% of total export 
earnings, continue to play a major role due to improved infrastructure (e.g. new container 
terminal at the deep-water harbour of Lomé and roads). 
 
 
 
Q12 | Sustainability 
Q12.1 | Environmental policy 3 
 
There is a growing degradation of environment and natural resources mainly due to 
population pressure, inadequate cropping systems and neglect but also to global climate 
change. Lomé was ranked among the 15 most affected African locations by climate change by 
Jeune Afrique in October 2014. The waterside of the capital losses about 10 meter p.a. and 
smaller villages situated along the coast like Baguida, Gbodjomé, Agborafo successively 
immerse in the sea. Since 1990, 43.6 % of its forest has been lost. Notably between 2000 and 
2005, Togo had one of the highest deforestation rates in the world. According to the 
environmental protection index (Yale university 2014) Togo figures still at the bottom of 
global ranking (163 of 178 countries) though with slightly improving tendency (+ 4.65% in 
the 10-year trend). Environmental laws and programs have been adopted long ago but they are 
insufficient and the government is slow in its implementation. The World Bank backed 
second Interim Strategy Note (2012-13) which focused on growth, governance and poverty 
reduction, includes environmental protection. Deforestation rates remain high at an annual 
rate of 1.4% of the forest. They date back a. o. to early colonialism and the establishment of 
cotton production for export in a strange alliance between African American emancipation 
and German imperialism at Tove and surrounding villages. Attempts of reforestation (226.16 
hectares up to 2010) are insufficient to counteract this development. This is attributable 
mainly to slash-and-burn agriculture and the use of wood for fuel. The government aims to 
influence a change in habits by subsidizing kerosene and household gas as a substitute for the 
domestic use of firewood, but to little avail. Water pollution presents health hazards and 
hinders the fishing industry. Air pollution is increasing rapidly in urban areas. But the 
government has yet to formulate more specific policies on pollution. It should be mentioned, 
however, that the environment in most Togolese towns is much cleaner compared to years 
past, as some waste management efforts have begun to yield improvements. In general 
however, eco-friendly consciousness is not well developed, neither by the population nor by 
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producers, including the mining companies, which results in serious environmental pollution 
(e.g. by phosphate sludge) and health hazards. 
 
Q12.2 | Education policy / R&D 4 
 
The entire education system had suffered under the political and economic crisis of the past 
decades from which it recovered with remarkable success . Free primary school education 
was introduced in 2008. Gross enrolment ratio increased considerably (133%, 2012; net 
enrolment ratio 94.3%, 2008-2011; UNICEF 2014 ) and compares now favourably with 
neighbouring African states. Overall primary school completion rate (TAP) increased from 
57% to 77% (2008-2012, World Bank), although gender inequality still exists (female 52%, 
male 71%; 2005-2010, PRB 2014). The youth (15 to 24 years) literacy rate improved to 87% 
(male) and 73% (female) (2008-2011; UNICEF 2014). However, quality of schooling is 
worrying. Insufficient number and education of teachers and classes of 50 pupils are common. 
Increasingly, children aged between 5 and 14 are forced to work out of poverty of their 
families. Adult literacy rate remains low (total: 64%; male 76%; female: 53% (2008-2012, 
UNICEF 2014). There are strong regional inequalities in education as well, as indicated by 
the literacy rate (for the same age group) of just 25% in the Savanes region and 85% in Lomé, 
or in general of 43.5% in rural areas as compared with 79.2% in urban areas. The universities 
are overcrowded, and they lack materials, staff and learning facilities. Private schools are 
expensive – and not always of better quality. Secondary schooling remains  still on a low 
level(35% in 2010). However, the absorption rate of school leavers in the national economy 
persists to be limited and unemployment of school leavers is alarming. Public spending on 
education was 4.6 % of GDP (2008-2010, UNICEF 2014). 
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Management Index 
 
Level of Difficulty 
 
Q13 | Level of Difficulty 
Q13.1 | Structural constraints 7 
 
Togo is a small country with promising natural resources. The population still  depends to a 
large extent on subsistence farming. Major foreign exchange earner are the ailing phosphate 
sector, clinker, cement and cotton production and (mostly illicit) re-exports, all dependent on 
volatile terms of trade on the world market. In addition, the country only produces some of 
the energy that it needs. Togo is dependent on neighboring Ghana and Nigeria for electricity 
and gas supply. Access to electrical power remains a luxury for most of the Togolese 
population, whose main source of energy is firewood and charcoal, which combined comprise 
80% of the country’s energy. The sharp increases of food and energy prices, combined with 
the impact of the global economic crisis, have made matters worse for efficient governance. 
Migration, accelerated by the political crisis has had a dramatic negative impact on the 
country’s labor force in the last two decades. Many qualified Togolese can be found in 
Europe but also in neighboring West African countries. The lack of good government, 
including the lack of will of the ruling elite for a devolution of power, still constitutes the 
major single development barrier.  
However, increasing raw material demand of new global players like China and India provide 
the much needed stimulus to revive the export industries and to improve Togo’s bargaining 
position in economic cooperation (aid), as big infrastructure projects financed by Chinese aid 
show, e.g. the construction of a new Lomé international airport (141 Mio US $) by the China 
Airport Construction Group (CACGC), completed on 25 December 2014 with double the 
capacity of the present airport. At the same time good foreign relations with the new global 
players allow for a resumption of the see-saw policy already successfully practiced in times of 
the Cold War between competing major donor countries. 
 
Q13.2 | Civil society traditions 5 
 
Civil society development flourished with the  second wind of change since the early 1990s. 
Today, there are thousands of NGOs and associations in all spheres of public life that exercise 
their right to freely express their opinion or form self-help groups (cf. ‘interest groups’). This 
has resulted – mainly in the cities – in the creation of a multitude of different associations, 
often competing against each other for both the right to represent their clientele and for donor 
support. There are notable partnerships between various interest groups that have been forged 
around issues such as human rights, elections, gender and micro financing. This indeed is a 
clear sign of agency and a vibrant civil society determined to take its fate in its own hands. 
Some of these civil society organizations should exercise greater transparency in defining 
their operational mode and objectives. It remains to be seen whether such associations will 
gain the same strength in rural areas that they have in urban areas, especially Lomé. 
 
Q13.3 | Conflict intensity 5 
 
The high potential for conflict that existed under Gnassingbé Eyadéma’s rule through the 
ethnic polarization and the militarization of society can no longer be considered the one 
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crucial impediment to Togo’s development. Both elements still need to be paid attention to. 
The most important determining factor in conflict remains the power politics of the 
Gnassingbé clan and its followers. It should be mentioned that Togo has not yet encountered 
severe tensions between different religious groups. Generally, the relationship between 
Muslims and Christians is amicable. Cooperation is sought by both groups on many 
occasions. Transnational conflicts of transhumance between pastoralist and agriculturalist are 
still virulent beneath the surface. Occasionally they erupt violently in about one third of the 
prefectures, notably in northern and central Togo. Thus, violent conflicts between Fulbe 
nomads and local peasants of Bago (Central Togo at the Benin border) resulted in 50 dead and 
over 100 injured persons in August 2011. Regional inequality and resulting sentiments of 
distrust and mutual antipathy between the people in the south and those in the north still need 
to be addressed. Having enjoyed the spoils of the system throughout much of recent history, 
northern Kabyè still hold an unduly high number of relevant public offices compared to their 
counterparts in the south. There are sharp and increasing differences between the poor and the 
rich in Togo, but these have not yet led to a situation of violent conflict. Yet, growing 
discontent among unemployed school leavers contributes to political unrest in urban centers, 
notably in Lomé. 
 
 
 
Management Performance 
 
Q14 | Steering Capability 
Q14.1 | Prioritization 4 
 
It remains unclear whether the political leadership as a whole is committed to political 
democratization, decentralization and economic liberalization. At least, according to the 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2014, Togo left the  group of the ten worst performers. 
It ranked 36th out of 52 African countries (46.4 of 100 scores; 5-year change:  +2.8%)) 
although it still remained in the bottom half of African countries. Actual politics point into the 
same direction.  However, cleavages between hardliners and modernizers within the 
Gnassingbé clan and its followers in the ruling party and the security forces are still 
simmering. They can outburst anytime if its power base in politics and economy will be 
threatened by lost elections. In addition, a broad coalition of radical and moderate political 
parties together with civic movements demand more vigorously an end of decades of 
Gnassingbé rule.  
In 2008 Togo joined the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the NEPAD as 29th 
member. The APRM is meant to enhance good governance in the sub-region. However, first 
measures to install a nationwide evaluation structure in Togo started only reluctantly in 2011. 
There is a national APRM commission, composed by 37 CSOs, hand-selected by the 
government, and members of the public administration. On 29 January 2014, Edem Kodjo, 
leader of the CPP, RPT founding member and former prime-minister, nominated by Lomé, 
was appointed to replace one of the outgoing APR-Panel members of Eminent Persons meant 
to oversight the APRM process. There is a need to complete the self-assessment and the 
programme of action, since the national structures have been created and sensitization 
campaigns were regularly organized to inform stakeholders about the APRM process. 
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Q14.2 | Implementation 5 
 
The administration has the support of the international donor community for these efforts. In 
September 2011 a new defence partnership between France and Togo came into force, which 
replaced the outdated secret military assistance agreements of the Eyadéma era. Apart from 
the traditional partners, such as France, Germany and the United States, China and India also 
supported the country with development aid during the review period. However, aid by the 
new Asian global players is usually not tied to political conditions. In addition to the 
revitalization of bilateral cooperation, international organizations like the IMF, World Bank, 
the BOAD and the European Union are also reinforcing their assistance in order to promote 
good government,  democratization and inclusive growth in Togo. The first IMF financed 
three-year Extended Credit Facility (ECF), which had replaced the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, expired in 2011. Due to reluctant implementation of IMF’s recommendations 
it will be extended by  a successor ECF earliest in 2015 (see Macrostability). 
 
Q14.3 | Policy learning 5 
 
The presidential elections of March 2010 as well as the legislative elections of July 2013, 
passed off largely peacefully and were considered largely democratic by African peers and the 
donor community. This was in stark contrast to the previous rigged presidentials of 2005 with 
its aftermath of bloody political persecution. Apparently, the Gnassingbé regime had learned 
its lessons from the past. It was eager to boost up its irregularly acquired power through 
legitimacy, provided by peaceful and largely free though not fair legislative (2007, 2013) and 
presidential (2010) elections and modernization of the ruling party. Nevertheless, Faure 
Gnassignbé and his party (RPT/UNIR) successfully employed the same policy of ‘divide and 
rule’ which already his father Eyadéma had used masterly over decades to weaken the 
opposition movement both by legal and extra-legal means. However, his power is contested 
by hard-liners from his own ranks. The international donor community, in the first place the 
EU, the IMF, France and USA, are mostly concerned with regional stability and the growing 
threat of Islamism and terrorism in the Sahel region (Mali) and Nigeria.  However, in general, 
the transition process remains volatile and might easily be reversed when pressure is put on 
the president, e. g. by hard-liners in the military or within the ruling party. 
 
 
 
Q15 | Resource Efficiency 
Q15.1 | Efficient use of assets 5 
 
Togo is still suffering from an underutilization of assets and other opportunities which could 
be used by the government. The new reform processes, assisted by the international donor 
community, notably the Bretton Woods institutions and its ECF programme, have improved 
an efficiency oriented governance approach in some areas, e.g. in public administration and 
finance as well as infrastructure rehabilitation, for example a new 100 mw multi-fuel power 
plant in Lomé connected to the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) inaugurated in July 2010 
in order to overcome the regular power cuts, new telecommunications network and road 
rehabilitation. However, it will take some time before the structural reforms have an impact, 
and continuing aid will be crucial to promote the process. Donor confidence remains the most 
important resource in providing an initial push towards development in Togo. 
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A key sector remains education. Whereas children are now attending school, there are not 
enough teachers to teach them, despite the high numbers of potential teaching personnel in the 
country. Most of the qualified Togolese teachers, waiting for an opportunity to work in their 
own country again, are still abroad because the former government, suspicious of educators, 
drove them away. Likewise decades of political crisis and deficient economic freedom 
discouraged private foreign investment. It is difficult to revitalize confidence of foreign 
investors, although enhanced competition with new global players like China is good for 
business. 
 
Q15.2 | Policy coordination 6 
 
The coordination between the presidency and the prime minister’s office appears to run not 
always smoothly. In July 2012 the head of state had to replace former prime minister Gilbert 
Houngbo, a technocrat recognized by the donor community who stepped down because of a 
bitter dispute with the president on continuing arbitrary acts of the intelligence service. He 
was replaced by the former minister for trade, K. S. Aboomey-Zunu, renowned as loyalist of 
the ruling elite. Because the president apparently still lacks overall control of the ANR and the 
military, he is at pains to restructure the commanding heights of the security services. 
Nevertheless, he still keeps the portfolio of defence for himself, in fear of coup attempts. In 
general, there are steps into the right direction which, however, are still outweighed by the 
corrupt and criminal practices (drug trafficking, capital flight and money laundering) of many 
members of the current administration – at all levels. 
 
Q15.3 | Anti-corruption policy 4 
 
There exists a national anti-corruption commission (Commission nationale de lutte contre la 
corruption et le sabotage économique – CNLCSE) created in 2001. However, it lacks the 
political will to combat corruption effectively. Corruption is still rampant in Togo. In 2008, 
Togo was for the first time ever included in the annual Corruption Perception Index of 
Transparency International, and ranked the third most corrupt WAEMU state, at the bottom 
end (rank 130) of 163 countries worldwide. Since then, it improved only slightly (rank 126 of 
174 in 2014; score: 29 of 100 points). The World Bank survey of businesses in 2010 revealed 
that 60% believed that the courts were neither impartial nor free from corruption. The whole 
society is aware of the need to undertake decisive steps to eradicate this problem. However, 
this seems to be a difficult policy step to take because it would cut the lifeline of large parts of 
the current Togolese elite and administration. In July 2007, a law against money laundering 
was enacted after serious debate in parliament which had little effect up to now. There are 
serious concerns regarding the link of corruption, money laundering and drug trafficking as 
Togo becomes a transit country for all forms of trafficking, possibly with involvement of high 
ranking members of the Gnassingbé clan. In addition, the Inter-Governmental Action Group 
against Money Laundering in West Africa complained in May 2011 that the government does 
not persecute international money laundering although the legal framework to do so was 
established. The high amount of illicit financial flows which strongly correlates with money 
laundering arouse the concern of the international donor community. Illicit capital flows are a 
strong indicator of the extent of a countries underground economy. According to a report of 
the renowned international NGO Global Financial Integrity (GFI, Washington D.C.) Togo 
figured among the three most heavily involved African states South of the Sahara alongside 
South Africa, Nigeria and Ivory Coast. Moreover Togo belonged as sole Sub-Saharan African 
state beside Congo to the worldwide 20 largest under-invoicers of export proceeds (GFI 
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2014:18). Illicit outflows from Togo averaged 1.847 bn US $ p.a. (66% of GDP) between 
2002 and 2011, with a peak (4.471 bn $) in 2008 when its equivalent representing 140% of 
GDP (3.174 bn $) surpassed four times the annual budget (IMF, GFI, 2014).  
 
 
Q16 | Consensus-Building 
Q16.1 | Consensus on goals 5 
 
A Global Political Accord (APG) was established in 2006 by major political parties and civic 
organizations, assisted by the EU. However, it was implemented only halfheartedly by the 
government. A population census, the first since nearly three decades, was duly executed in 
2010/11 and recognized by the population. Moreover, the CVJR delivered its report on HR 
violations in April 2012.. Other important measures meant to guarantee fair and free elections, 
including local elections reported time and again since 1987, are still pending. A domestic 
process of dialogue between major contesting political parties (Cadre permanent de dialogue 
et de concertation, CPDC), established in 2009, got stuck several times (latest in May 2014)  
because of lack of consensus. On 2 October 2014 the re-elected president of the Constitutional 
court Assouma declared the APG as obsolete and void with the advent of a functioning 
pluralist parliament, as allegedly proven by the decision of the UNIR and UFC majority in 
parliament on 30 June 2014 to vote against the draft law on constitutional changes submitted 
by its own government. Shortly before, representatives of the Christian churches had again 
appealed to the political class to reopen the discussions on contentious institutional and 
constitutional reforms before the 2015 presidential elections. Thus, overall consensus on 
transformation goals remains fragile. There are still some key cleavages running through 
Togolese society that result from the regional and ethnic discriminations and the exclusion of 
opposition movement of the past, and from the high socioeconomic disparities found in the 
country.  
 
The majority (e.g., the governing party and most of the opposition) agree on the country’s 
need to regain economic strength, a view shaped by the severe hardships experienced by 
many Togolese in everyday life. Political change, requested by many if not the majority, is 
also seen as an instrument for urgently needed social and economic development. On the one 
hand, these daily hardships might lead one day to serious social strife. On the other hand, 
citizens appear willing to support any government that shows genuine concern for the 
problems of the majority. In general, government, ruling party, the opposition and CSOs are 
dedicated to the basic rules of market economies. As a transit-economy, Togo depends on 
open markets and trans-national trade, notably within ECOWAS and the big markets in 
neighbouring Ghana and Nigeria. However, because a great part of this trade is informal 
(including smuggling) the recognition of official rules and regulations on taxation, tax-
evasion, money-laundering, capital flight etc. is rather weak. Apart from this, there are 
divergent views within the ruling elite on the need to protect infant industries and commercial 
agriculture against unfair foreign trade policies within the framework of the controversial EU-
West African Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Negotiations on EPAs which 
dragged on since 2002 were increasingly under pressure by the EU that wanted to conclude 
the deal latest 1 October. Although Brussels applied a stick and carrot policy, apparently at 
least five countries, among them Nigeria and Togo, had refused to sign up to the end of the 
year.  
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Q16.2 | Anti-democratic actors 5 
 
The RPT/UNIR’s purely anti-democratic elements are no longer as important as they had 
been before the presidential elections of 2010. They are still strong enough, however, to 
endanger any serious attempt made by President Faure Gnassingbé to further democratization 
and a meaningful devolution of power. President Faure Gnassingbé’s imprisoned half-brother, 
Kpatcha, might play an important role in this respect. He and some people in the military and 
RPT/UNIR leadership know about the disadvantages they will have to face in the event of a 
change in government. Cracks in the ruling elite, composed of the Gnassingbé family, the 
RPT/UNIR and the security services, became apparent once more, during the modernization 
of the ruling party in 2012 as well as by the refusal of the UNIR majority in parliament to vote 
in favour of a draft law on changes of the constitution introduced by its own government in 
June 2014. In addition, it must be noted that democratic rules of the game as well as a culture 
of transparency and accountability are not fully respected among the new elites of Togo, 
including the opposition. This was shown by the schism of the major opposition party UFC 
and ANC. 
 
Q16.3 | Cleavage / conflict management 5 
 
The Gnassingbé clan and its followers continue to pursue a policy of creating or stimulating 
conflicts in order to exercise its authoritarian regulatory power. The most recent example 
were the arson attacks on the central markets of Lomé and Kara (January 2013) used by the 
government to harass opposition leaders. In contrast, a report on findings released by the CST 
on 11. November 2013 revealed key figures of the regime as the ring-leaders of the market 
fires. Media close to the opposition than draw already analogies to the political 
instrumentalization of the Reichstag fire in Nazi Germany in 1933. 
 
There are no consistent policies in place to systematically address emerging conflicts in the 
country. Nevertheless, there have been some positive steps taken. The administration 
recognized, for example, that the environmental problems arising from nomads and their 
cattle herds during transhumance, which often leads to problems with settled farmers, whose 
agricultural production is endangered, must be addressed. A national committee is now trying 
to find lasting solutions to this conflict by taking into consideration views from both sides. 
Due to the oppressive and corrupt nature of the previous regime, which affected almost every 
institution in the country, there are few non-governmental actors that are powerful enough to 
mediate in actual or future conflicts, with one notable exception the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (CVJR) and the Christian Church. The NGOs that specialize in conflict 
prevention and management are not yet strong enough to play a decisive role. 
 
Q16.4 | Civil society participation 5 
 
The present government seems to be much more open to civil society participation than any 
government heretofore. The inefficient use of civil society organizations’ capacities is 
sometimes more due to the weakness of the NGOs’ administration and membership structure 
than to the government’s reluctance to engage with them. Enhanced dialogue between CSOs  
and government is slowly becoming a reality. Both sides must work hard to overcome the 
distrust in the present situation that has been nourished by the poor state of relations in the 
past decades. 
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Q16.5 | Reconciliation 5 
 
In May 2009 a truth and reconciliation commission (‘Commission Vérité, Justice et 
Réconciliation’, CVJR) was established meant to investigate human rights violations from 
1958 up to the bloody persecutions of 2005. It was presided by Mgr. Nicodème Benissan-
Barrigah and supported by the UNHCR office in Lomé. The CVJR’s 11 members represented 
different groups of civil society (excluding political parties) and notably involved religious 
leaders. During its enquiries it received over 20,000 petitions which indicated a high degree of 
trust within the population. It submitted its final report in April 2012. The most important 
recommendations included reparation, public documentation of HR violations, symbolic 
reconciliation (e. g. public condonation by perpetrators, monuments, memorial days), and last 
but not least criminal prosecution of perpetrators. The Commission demanded the government 
to publish a White Paper on how it intends to implement the recommendations of the CVJR 
and suggested two institutions for monitoring and evaluation. Unfortunately, the government 
is reluctant to implement the recommendations which is no wonder because high ranking 
members of government, military and administration figured among the perpetrators who 
continue to profit from impunity. Apart from publishing a ‘White Paper’ and the installation 
of a High Commission on Reconciliation (HCR) in 2013 the government applied mainly 
delaying tactics. On 17 April 2014 the Council of Ministers published a draft White Paper on 
the implementation of the CVJR’s recommendations, considered to be the precondition of the 
eventual payment of reparation. 
 
 
 
Q17 | International Cooperation 
Q17.1 | Effective use of support 7 
 
Resumption of aid and substantial support from donors to the Togolese government only 
started in 2007 after the largely free legislative elections. The numerous activities and 
cooperation programs such as the ECF, PRGF and HIPC completion point were connected to 
the progress made in political transformation. The use of the aid was strictly supervised by the 
donors. However, support from donors was not always used efficiently and transparent. Togo 
counts among the aid orphans with and aid dependency of 36% of GNI. However, according 
to a report of the Bristol-based NGO Development Initiatives published in September 2013, 
the bulk of reported aid never gets anywhere near the target groups. Notably it often lacked 
the necessary involvement of all major players in society in order to gain public support and 
the international community’s confidence, as promised by the Paris Declaration and later 
reaffirmed in the Accra Agenda for Action. The entry of new Asian powers, notably China 
and India in the aid business allows for a successful resumption of Togo’s see-saw policy 
already practiced in times of the Cold War between competing major donor countries. 
Apart from aid, remittances could play a significant role in development although apparently 
there existed no direct link between remittances and economic growth. According to OECD 
statistics Togo ranked high on a global scale both with ODA per capita (91 US$ in 2011, 17. 
rank) and 52 US$ remittances per capita (7. rank worldwide) respectively (OECD 2014). 
Remittances constitute an important supplementary source of financial inflows also because 
they act countercyclical, i.e they increase during downturns, unlike other capital flows like 
FDI. 
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Q17.2 | Credibility 6 
 
The most important task to consolidate the government’s newly acquired credibility among 
the international community and among the Togolese population is the effective combat of 
generalized corruption at all levels of the state. Besides, as of now there are still two deeply 
contrasting interpretations of the government’s actual intentions, both among the Togolese 
population and the international donor community: those, who believe in genuine 
transformation and are hopeful that a democratic era has just begun, and those, who believe 
the government’s attitude is a masquerade camouflaging its attempt to stay in power at all 
costs. 
 
Q17.3 | Regional cooperation 7 
 
Togo is a member of all relevant regional, African and international organizations, notably of 
ECOWAS and WAEMU in the West African sub-region. President Faure Gnassingbé and 
members of his government are trying to return to a situation where Togo plays a constructive 
role as regional mediator and host to international meetings as in the ‘glorious past’ of the 
father of the incumbent, General Eyadéma The latter was recognized as mediator in 
international African conflicts by his African peers, although being the longest serving 
African dictator. Togo remained a reliable and significant contributor to peace-keeping 
missions in the sub-region. In May 2012 Nigeria, Togo, Ivory Coast and Senegal contribute to 
the ECOWAS force’s first troop deployment in the failed state of Guinea Bissau. Later on, 
Lomé contributed to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) 
organized by ECOWAS against the growing thread of Islamist terror organizations in 
Northern Mali as well as to the UN led MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) corresponding to a Security Council resolution 2164 
of 25 June 2014. Togo committed 500 troops to the total of 3,464 soldiers (commitments) of 
different ECOWAS states. The mission was authorized by the UN security council resolution 
2058 on 20 December2012. In addition, it contributed overall 1.747 troops and security 
personnel in 2014 for various UN peacekeeping missions (UN 09.2014). In July 2014, the 
United-States offered military equipment worth US$ 8 million to support Togo’s 
peacekeeping mission in Mali. 
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Strategic Outlook 
 
Like most Sub-Saharan countries, Togo faces several problems: the lack of good governance, 
the volatility of growth in an economy particularly exposed to external shocks, rising food 
costs, erratic energy prices, and possible risks connected with the HIV/AIDS and Ebola 
pandemic. But there are a few key issues the country should address if it is to reach a level of 
development on par with that achieved by other, more successful African countries, 
neighbouring West African countries, like Benin and Ghana. 
 
Based on the peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections, Togo’s government should 
not ease its efforts to win sustainable trust and confidence of its own population as well as that 
of the international community. The reforms implemented during the last years have been met 
with considerable support both within and outside the country. The prevailing question among 
Togolese citizens and of observers, however, regards the genuine character of the attempts of 
the Gnassingbé regime to democratize the Togolese society. Unless confidence is built in the 
sustainability of the current process, Togo’s transformation process will not succeed. The 
following challenges should be addressed:  
 
The coalition ‘government of recovery’ formed in May 2010 by the two major parties 
(RPT/UNIR and UFC) should pursue consequently and in a transparent manner its aims of 
national reconciliation, democratization and sustainable development on the base of 
international accepted rules of ‘good governance’. The postponed local elections as well as 
the upcoming presidentials (April 2015) should be managed effectively and impartial so that 
they could be recognized internationally as ‘free and fair’. In order to overcome some of 
Togo’s endemic development problems (i.e., over-centralized decision-making processes, the 
ruling party’s undemocratic dominance, rulers’ distance from on-the-ground realities, 
regionalism), support for the thorough implementation of the formulated decentralization 
policy should be enhanced. Devolution of power and resources in order to enhance local 
autonomy, as demanded by the constitution should no longer be obstructed by the 
government. This should be accompanied by support to civil society organizations at local 
and national levels.  
 
The transition process will not succeed if the government remains under the threat of hard-
liners within the security services to meddle into politics. Therefore, it will be imperative to 
attain and to guarantee strict political neutrality of the security forces, notably the military, 
intelligence service and the gendarmerie.  
 
Concerning economics, the structural reforms of the banking, phosphate and cotton sector are 
crucial. Donors should make an effort to accompany this process. The fight against 
corruption, money laundering, capital flight and embezzlement of public funds in Togo’s 
administration constitutes another significant step on the road to democratization. Since 
donors’ contributions will have to play a crucial role for Togo’s economic resurrection, 
international partners must demand that their support will be accompanied by a clear and 
thoroughly monitored fight against corruption and money laundering. In this respect also 
international business activities in Togo should be closely observed whether they stick to the 
same ethic and legal rules. Any activity that fosters law enforcement on this level should be 
supported. This includes taking pre-emptive steps to ensure that Togo does not remain a hub 
of trafficking within the sub region. 
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Donors should further harmonize their approaches and align the priorities set by the current 
Togolese government, namely good governance, health, education, road infrastructure.   
 
Last but not the least, it seems important to support the process of regional integration in West 
Africa. Any attempts to undermine sincere African political initiatives of regional integration, 
e.g. by special arrangements within the current negotiations on EU West African EPAs) 
should be prevented. Greater exchange – in both economic and political terms – would serve 
to benefit all stakeholders. In addition, peacekeeping initiatives and observation measures in 
the West African region should be promoted. 
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